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I feel deeply honored to have this opportunity of paying tribute to 
the memory of Sir John Crawford and to his many contributions to 
agricultural research and economic development. Sir John was a 
powerful practitioner, but he was also involved in bridging theory 
and practice, and keen on investigating connections that may not be 
straightforward. 
The links between food and freedom may at first sight appear to 
be rather remote to policymaking and far from central to practical 
concerns. I shall argue against that view, trying to discuss the various 
important connections that have to be recognized more fully as 
background to practical food policy. I shall not, of course, deny the 
fact that these connections are not typically taken to be straightfor- 
ward preludes to practical policymaking, but I will argue that we 
have to probe deeper for an adequate background to policymaking. 
Food for freedom and freedom for food 
“Grub first, then ethics,” thus runs a much quoted aphorism of 
Bertolt Brecht. There is undoubtedly some sense in this phased 
gradation. Ethics may seem like a much more remote and much less 
immediate subject than the command over food that we need to 
survive. Freedom too-as an important concept in ethics-may seem 
to be far less immediate than the compelling demands of grabbing 
grub. 
But this contrast is quite artificial. The provision of food is indeed 
a central issue in general social ethics, since so much in human life 
does depend on the ability to find enough to eat. In particular, the 
freedom that people enjoy to lead a decent life, including freedom 
from hunger, from avoidable morbidity, from premature mortality, 
etc., is quite centrally connected with the provision of food and 
related necessities. Also, the compulsion to acquire enough food may 
force vulnerable people to do things which they resent doing, and may 
make them accept lives with little freedom. The role of food in 
fostering freedom can be an extremely important one. 
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On the other side, freedom may also causally influence the success 
of the pursuit of food for all. One consideration that has received a 
great deal of attention recently relates to the role of freedom to make 
profits in providing incentives for the expansion of food production, 
thus helping to solve the food problem. This consideration has often 
cropped up in the critical evaluation of agricultural policies pursued 
in many countries in Africa and Asia. For example, the rapid expan- 
sion of agricultural output in China in the economic reforms carried 
out from 1979 onwards has, with much justice, been seen to be closely 
related to the freeing of markets and the unleashing of productive 
opportunities connected with profit incentives. These experiences 
invite attention and scrutiny. 
Other types of freedom may also have important instrumental roles 
to play in the guaranteeing of food for all. Insofar as public policy to 
combat hunger and starvation-including rapid intervention against 
threatening famines-may depend on the existence and efficiency of 
political pressure groups to induce governments to act, political 
freedom too may have a close connection with the distribution of 
relief and food to vulnerable groups. There are other possible causal 
connections-operating in both directions-which may be worth 
investigating, and some of these I will indeed try to examine and 
assess in this lecture. Freedom to make profits is not the only freedom 
the causal influence of which would have to be considered. 
Thus, what may superficially appear to be rather remote connec- 
tions between food and freedom can be seen to be, in fact, central in 
importance and extremely rich in the variety of influences involved, 
operating in the two respective directions, viz., from food to freedom, 
and from freedom to food. I shall try to supplement the conceptual 
and theoretical discussions with illustrations from practical problems 
with empirical content. Freedom and ethics are indeed very practical 
matters in the determination of food policy. 
Four concepts of freedom 
In a justly famous essay called “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Isaiah 
Berlin’ made an important distinction between “negative” and “posi- 
tive” theories of freedom. The negative view sees freedom exclusively 
in terms of the independence of the individual from interference by 
others, including governments, institutions and other persons. The 
2 positive view, which can be characterized in many different ways, 
sees freedom not in terms of the presence or absence of interference 
by others, but in terms of what a person is actually able to do or to 
be. The distinction may be quite central to different approaches to 
the idea of freedom and its implications.2 If a person is not free from 
hunger and lacks the means and the practical opportunities to feed 
himself or herself adequately, then that person’s positive freedom 
must be seen as having been thoroughly compromised. On the other 
hand, his or her negative freedom may be completely unviolated, if 
this failure to acquire enough food is not a result of his or her having 
been stopped by interference from others. 
There is another distinction which is quite central to the content 
and role of freedom, and this concerns the issue of intrinsic im- 
portance of freedom as such, in addition to its instrumental roles. 
That freedom must have instrumental importance as a means to other 
ends is obvious enough. Our freedom to choose one bundle of 
commodities rather than another may have an important effect on the 
living standards we can have, the happiness we can enjoy, the 
well-being we can achieve, and the various objectives of our lives we 
can fulfill. Similarly, the absence of interference by others may have 
important causal influence on various things that we can do and 
value doing. In the “instrumental” view, freedom is taken to be 
important precisely because of its being a means to other ends, rather 
than being valuable in itself. 
In contrast, the “intrinsic” view of the importance of freedom 
asserts that freedom is valuable in itself, and not only because of what 
it permits us to achieve or do. The good life may be seen to be a life 
of freedom, and in that context freedom is not just a way of achieving 
a good life, it is constitutive of the good life itself. The “intrinsic” view 
does not deny that freedom may also be instrumentally important, but 
does reject the view that its importance lies entirely on its instrumen- 
tal function. 
It is easy to see that the two ways of categorizing different 
approaches to freedom can be combined with each other, yielding four 
distinct categories. It is indeed possible to look through the history 
of ideas to see how different thinkers sharing a regard for freedom 
fall into different categories, related to the positive-negative distinc- 
tion and to the intrinsic-instrumental classification. At the risk of over 
simplification I might illustrate the distinctions involved by referring 
to some particular examples. 
For example, Milton Friedman and James Buchanan have both 
tended to put considerable emphasis-indeed priority-n the nega- 
tive view of freedom, related to non-interference by the state, institu- 
tions and other individuals3 This contrasts with the emphasis on the 
positive view of freedom that can be found in the writings of, say, 
Bentham or Marx. On the other hand, within the negative perspective, 
Friedman is much more concerned with the instrumental role of 
freedom rather than its intrinsic importance, while Buchanan con- 
structs a “non-instrumental” normative case in favor of giving priority 
to liberties and democratic rights. Whereas Friedman concentrates 
primarily on what he calls “the fecundity of freedom”, Buchanan goes 
largely beyond this role of freedom as a means to other ends. 
Attaching intrinsic importance to negative freedom is seen also in the 
writings of John Rawls, Robert Nozick and other contemporary moral 
philosophers, and it is a position that was broadly shared also by 
John Stuart Mill4 
Similarly, among the various theories concentrating on positive 
freedom, some have seen freedom to be intrinsically important, such 
as Adam Smith and Karl Marx, following a line of reasoning that goes 
back to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. In fact, Aristotle 
had direct influence on Marx’s writings on this subject. Marx’s 
philosophical focus included giving a foundational role to bringing 
“the conditions for the free development and activity of individuals 
under their own control”, with a vision of a liberated society in the 
future that would make “it possible for me to do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, 
without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.“5 While 
his urban middle-class origins may have influenced Marx’s evident 
belief that evening is a good time to rear cattle (he was obviously on 
more familiar ground with “criticize after dinner”), the placing of this 
general perspective of freedom in Marx’s entire approach to eco- 
nomics, politics and society was altogether foundational. 
While John Rawls’ case for the “priority of liberty” attaches 
overriding importance to negative freedom, his advocacy of the 
importance of “primary goods” commanded by people reflects his 
basic concern for positive freedom as well. Primary goods include 
“rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social 
4 bases of self-respect”. Possessing these things adequately makes a 
person positively more free to pursue his or her objectives and ends, 
and Rawls develops his political concept of social justice based on 
the efficiency and equity in the distributions of these freedoms. 
In contrast, Jeremy Bentham’s ultimate concern is with utility only, 
and positive freedom is regarded as important in the Benthamite 
system only because that freedom may be conducive to more happi- 
ness. This is, of course, an instrumental view. The Benthamite 
instrumental-positive view of freedom contrasts with Marx’s 
intrinsic-positive view. And each in turn contrasts with the 
instrumental-negative view of Friedman, on the one hand, and the 
intrinsic-negative view of Buchanan and Nozick on the other. It is easy 
to find other examples to illustrate the contrasts, but perhaps the 
ones already mentioned will do. I ought to warn that these categories 
are often not very pure, and the same writers may have a certain 
amount of plurality within their overall theories (this was, of course, 
clearly seen in the case of Rawls in the preceding discussion). 
Food policy and alternative approaches to freedom 
This categorization is of crucial relevance even in understanding 
various demands on food policy, arising from different views of 
freedom. For example, the advocacy of greater freedom to earn profit 
in agriculture and of greater use of free market without much 
interference by the state and other public institutions [an advocacy 
that can, incidentally, be found in many documents of the host 
for this lecture, the World Bank] usually reflects an instrumental- 
negative view of freedom, applied to food policy. Freedom to earn 
profits without interference is advocated not because it is typically 
taken to be foundationally important on its own, but because it is 
seen to be conducive to such things as greater productivity, larger 
income and enhanced food output. In general, the perspective of 
incentives constitutes an instrumental focus, related to what Milton 
Friedman calls “the fecundity of freedom”, and in this particular case 
this is applied primarily to the negative view of freedom, seen in terms 
of non-interference. 
In contrast, the writings of some authors, such as Peter Bauer, have 
tended to go beyond the instrumental view even in the context of 
agricultural development, emphasizing the importance of people 
having the right to enjoy the fruits of their own creation, without 
interference by the state or by other institutions or individuals.6 Bauer 
has seen this as a central feature of a good agricultural policy. The 
instrumental consideration of incentives is not denied in this perspec- 
tive (far from it), but the ethical argument goes well beyond that, to 
intrinsic importance as well. 
On the other hand, economic approaches emphasizing the need to 
fulfill “basic needs” for food and other essentials, or to pursue public 
policy to guarantee “freedom from hunger”, and so on, take a positive 
view of freedom, concentrating on what people are able actually to 
do or be, rather than what they are prevented by others from doing 
or being.7 The focus of this literature has often tended to be on 
pragmatic rather than foundational issues. Concentration on “free- 
dom from hunger” and related objectives can indeed be defended 
either on grounds of their supposed intrinsic importance, or be- 
cause of their instrumental role in serving other-allegedly more 
basic-goals, such as enhancement of happiness or welfare of indi- 
viduals. The instrumental view can be seen clearly in the analysis 
presented by one of the earliest writers on “basic needs” (though he 
did not use that expression), viz. A.C. Pigou, in The Economics of 
WeJfare.8 For an example on the other side, Paul Streeten’s approach 
is perhaps best seen in terms of intrinsic value being attached to these 
respective freedoms to fulfill the various “basic needs”.g 
The instrumental-intrinsic distinction relates to the foundational 
question as to what is regarded as valuable in itself, and what must 
be seen as important only as a contributor to other more basic goals. 
This is a question of deep philosophical interest, but it has pragmatic 
importance too, since instrumental arguments turn ultimately on the 
correctness of the cause-effect relationships postulated. For example, 
if it emerges that free markets and profit earnings do not provide 
much incentive for the expansion of production, or do not contribute 
to bettering living standards, the instrumental defense of these free 
market policies may well collapse, but this need not disestablish at 
all the view (e.g., Bauer’sl that would see the right to earn these profits 
to be intrinsically important. In this sense, the intrinsic view is less 
vulnerable to empirical counter-argument, but it has, of course, 
greater need of foundational ethical defense. 
The position is a little different as far as positive freedom is 
concerned. A policy of state intervention, e.g., in the distribution of 
food, is scarcely ever regarded as being of fundamental value of its 
6 own. The possibility of foundational valuation arises at a somewhat 
later stage (in this respect its contrast with the valuing of right-based 
procedures, as in the systems of Robert Nozick or Peter Bauer, is quite 
sharp], and valuing positive freedom has to be based on a good deal 
of instrumental analysis in moving from the means of state interven- 
tion to the realization of positive freedom. 
The difference between the “intrinsic” and “instrumental” views of 
positive freedom lies, in this context, in the length to which the 
instrumental analysis has to be carried. In the broadly Aristotelian 
view, which sees the capability to achieve important functionings as 
being valuable in itself, the instrumental analysis can end at that 
point, but in those views in which positive freedom happens to be no 
more than means to other ends, e.g., in the pursuit of utility, the 
instrumental analyses have to go further into the translation of 
freedom into the fulfillment of other goals. In each case there is need 
to examine the effects of policies such as public distribution of food 
on the positive freedoms that individuals can actually obtain, and the 
difference arises only at a later stage, in moving from freedom to 
achievement. In this respect the positive freedom view is basically 
more instrument-dependent than the negative freedom approach is. 
These considerations may, at first glance, appear to be rather 
distant from the nitty-gritty of practical policymaking in the field of 
food and hunger. But foundational questions are ultimately quite 
central to the acceptability of particular policy analyses. While the 
tendency to avoid facing these foundational questions is quite com- 
mon, it is more a reflection of escapism than a demonstration of 
uncanny wisdom. Ultimately policies have to be justified in terms of 
what is valuable and how various policies may respectively enhance 
these valuable things. There is no escape, therefore, from considering 
both the question of what is fundamentally valuable and the question 
of what instruments enhance these things best. It is indeed the 
combination of the intrinsic considerations and instrumental analy- 
ses that can lead the way to an adequate examination of what should 
be done and why. 
While these conceptual and theoretical discussions can be carried 
further-I have tried to discuss some of these further issues else- 
wherelO- shall devote the rest of this lecture to rather practical 
matters, dealing with actual policy disputes in the field of food and 
hunger. 
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Opulence and living standard 
A preliminary point first. The process of economic development is 
often seen in terms of the expansion of the material basis of well- 
being and freedom that people can enjoy. This approach has a 
rationale that is easy to understand, since the positive freedoms that 
we can enjoy and the well-being levels that we can achieve are both 
dependent on the commodity bundles over which we can establish 
command. This clearly is the sense behind assessing economic 
development in terms of the progress of real gross national product 
per head. On the other hand, freedom and well-being depend also on 
the use that is made of the opulence of the nation. Income distribu- 
tions can vary. No less importantly, the command that people enjoy 
over essential food, health services, medical attention, etc., depends 
crucially on the delivery system for these commodities. A public 
distribution system geared to the needs of the vulnerable sections of 
the community can bring the essentials of livelihood within easy 
reach of people whose lives may remain otherwise relatively un- 
touched by the progress of real national income. 
Table 1 illustrates the point. Oman or South Africa may have a 
gross national product per head that is a great many times higher 
than that of China or Sri Lanka, but each of the former has under-five 
mortality rates (covering infants and children) that is two or three 
times higher than those prevailing in the poorer economies. The life 
expectancy at birth in Oman and South Africa lingers around the 
mid-fifties, while China and Sri Lanka have achieved longevity rates 
reasonably close to those prevailing in Europe and America. 
Table 1. Opulence, Life and Death 
GNP Per Head Life Expectancy 
[Dollars) at Birth 
1985 1985 
Under-8 Mortality 
Rate (Per Thousand) 
1985 
Oman 6,730 54 172 
South Africa 2,010 55 104 
Brazil 1,640 65 91 
Sri Lanka 380 70 50 
China 310 69 48 
Sources: World Development Report, 1987; The State of the World’s Children, 1987. 
This is, of course, a well-known point, but it is worth emphasizing 
in the present context, since the demands of agricultural policy in 
general and food policy in particular are often seen primarily in terms 
of expanding the material bases of well-being and freedom. Indeed, 
as we shah presently see, there is an important policy issue related 
to this question even in terms of the recent economic reforms in 
China. The point to note here is that the positive freedom to lead a 
long life may well be typically enhanced by expansion of material 
prosperity, but the relationship is far from a tight one, and indeed it 
is quite possible for the freedom to live long to go down, while the 
level of economic opulence goes up. The shift of focus from the 
national product to the freedom enjoyed by members of the nation 
can bring about a major reexamination of the requirements of 
economic policy. 
The freedom to live long is, of course, only one of the positive 
freedoms that may be thought to be important. It is a freedom that is 
particularly valued since our ability to do other things is, obviously, 
conditional on our being here, and it is not surprising that the option 
of living longer is very rarely refused. This is, of course, the reason 
why longevity, which is an achievement, can also be seen as an 
important indicator of the freedom to live long (we tend to exercise 
this freedom, in most cases, to the maximum extent we can), and the 
metric of life expectancy is, thus, a fairly basic indicator of a 
foundational positive freedom. There are, however, other important 
positive freedoms as well, e.g., freedom from hunger and undernutri- 
tion, freedom from escapable morbidity, freedom to read and write 
and communicate. Indeed, the list of important freedoms must be seen 
to be a long one in any accounting that aims at some degree of 
comprehensiveness. While any practical analysis may have to confine 
attention to only a few indicators, the need to have a wider informa- 
tional base for a more definitive analysis has to be borne in mind. 
Often these indicators move in the same direction (e.g., life expect- 
ancy, avoidance of morbidity, and literacy frequently tend to be highly 
correlated), but this is not invariably the case. For example, in the 
contrast between different states in India, Kerala comes out as having 
very much higher life expectancy and literacy than any other Indian 
state, but in terms of morbidity rates, Kerala does not seem to have 
this advantage. Indeed, measured in the metric of reported illnesses, 
Kerala’s morbidity rate is much higher than that of many other Indian 9 
states.” Some of that difference may undoubtedly be due to the fact 
that a more literate population, with access to medical attention and 
health care, is likely to report illnesses more thoroughly. But it is 
possible that even after these corrections are made, there is some 
dissonance between Kerala’s performance in the fields of literacy and 
life expectancy and that in the prevention of morbidity.12 The conflicts 
between different indicators may not, of course, always be serious, 
but the general possibility has to be kept in view in interpreting 
results of empirical analysis based on one or a few indicators. In this 
sense, analyses of the kind pursued in this paper must be seen to be 
tentative, even though it can be argued that even a preliminary move 
in the direction of indicators of certain basic capabilities and free- 
doms can bring out aspects of economic policy in general and food 
policy in particular that tend to be overlooked in the more traditional 
concentration on national income in general and food production in 
particular. 
China and India 
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The comparison of the performances of China and India in dealing 
with problems of well-being and elementary freedoms has been one 
of the subjects of great interest in the field of comparative economics. 
In terms of achievements of GNP per head, China’s performance 
would seem to have been better than India’s, even though in terms of 
standard estimated figures, the Chinese GNP per head of $310 is only 
about 15 percent higher than India’s $270, for 1985. Since Simon 
Kuznets’13 estimate of GNP per head for China and India were about 
comparable, with a “product per capita” 20 percent higher in China, 
in 1958, it is tempting to think that China’s and India’s performances 
in terms of production have been roughly comparable. In fact these 
figures underestimate the relative performance of China vis-a-vis that 
of India, and if more comparable figures are used, China would seem 
to be further ahead than India in terms of national product and 
national income per head.‘* Nevertheless, it would appear that judged 
in this perspective, while the Chinese have done noticeably better 
than what has happened in India, the Chinese performance in this 
field is not tremendously superior to that of India. Furthermore, some 
of the advantages that China now enjoys compared with India as far 
as national product is concerned relate to the high growth rate of the 
Chinese economy in very recent years, since the economic reforms of 
1979. More on this later. 
In terms of calorie consumption per head, the Chinese picture is 
considerably better than India’s, as Table 2 reports. Here again, a big 
part of the difference has arisen only in recent years through the rapid 
expansion of agricultural output in general and food output in 
particular since the economic reforms. 
Table 2. China and India 
China India 
GNP per head ($1 1985 310 270 
Calorie consumption per 
head 1985 
2,602 2,189 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 1985 
69 56 
Under five mortality rate 
(per thousand) 1985 
50 158 
Famine mortality (millions): 
Chinese famines 1958-61 
29.5 
Excess Indian “normal” annual 
mortality (millions) 1985 
3.8 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: O.U.P., 1987); UNICEF, 
The State of the World’s Children, 1987 [New York: O.U.P., 1987); B. Ashton, et.al., 
“Famine in China 1958~61”, Population and Development Review, 10 (1984). 
If we look, instead, at the indicators of basic freedom to avoid 
premature mortality, i.e., life expectancy at birth, China’s performance 
would seem to be of a different order of magnitude altogether from 
that of India. Chart 1 presents the respective time series of life 
expectancy in the two countries. Beginning with life expectancy 
figures quite close to each other-not much above 40 years-in the 
early 1%&s, the Chinese have been able to raise the life expectancy 
figure to close to European standards, while India lags behind by a 
big margin. The difference in the achievement of a life expectancy 
close to 70 years and that in the mid-fifties is very large indeed, as 11 
Chart 1 
Life 
expectancy 
(years1 
Calendar year 
Source: See Amartya Sen, Hunger and Entitlements (Helsinki: WIDER, 1987). 
we know from the history of life-expectancy changes in different 
parts of the world. 
Famines and prevention 
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One of the interesting features in the comparison of life expectancy 
of China and India is the remarkably sharp drop that the Chinese 
figure has around 1958-61. These are the years of the Chinese famines 
following the failure of the Great Leap Forward. At one stage life 
expectancy had fallen to the mid-twenties. While the Indian progress 
of life expectancy has been slow, it has not undergone fluctuations 
of this kind at all. Indeed, it must be recognized that in the field of 
famine prevention, India’s record is distinctly superior to that of 
China. 
I have tried to argue elsewherei that India’s success in eliminating 
famines since Independence is not primarily the result of raising food 
output per head, as it is often thought to be. Indeed the increase in 
availability of food per head in India has been fairly moderate (as it 
had also been in China up to the economic reformPI and the ratio 
of food to population has remained lower in the post-Independence 
period than it was in the late 19th century, when India had several 
famines, The main difference has been brought about by an admin- 
istrative system which compensates the loss of entitlements as a 
result of such calamities as droughts and floods by providing employ- 
ment-often at cash wages-giving the affected population renewed 
ability to command food in the market. The process is further helped 
by using substantial stocks held in the public distribution system 
which can be brought in, to supplement what the creation of income 
does in regenerating lost entitlements. 
This administrative system does, in fact, have its roots in the 
Famine Codes formulated in British India in the 1880s. However, 
these Codes were often invoked too late, and intervention was often 
not a high priority item for the then government. In some cases, most 
notably in the notorious Bengal famine of 1943, no famine was ever 
officially “declared”, in order to avoid the necessity of taking actions 
required by the Famine Code (as Governor Rutherford of Bengal 
explicitly put it in an intra-government communication).17 The situa- 
tion is now altogether different given the nature of politics in 
post-Independent India. No government at the center-or at the state 
level&can get away without extreme political damage if it fails to 
take early action against famines. The presence of active opposition 
parties and a relatively free news distribution system provide the 
political triggering mechanism that the Famine Codes in their original 
form lacked.18 The availability of food in different parts of India has 
often fallen greatly below those prevailing in Ethiopia, Sudan, or the 
Sahel countries (see, for example, Table 31 at the time when they had 
their worst famines.lg Indeed, even the normal availability of food per 
head for India as a whole is not decisively higher than that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as Table 4 shows (India coming halfway down 
the list of Sub-Saharan economies, with less food availability per head 
than many countries with persistent famines]. 13 
Table 3. Famine. Averted Famine and Cereal Production:’ Sahel and India 
Gross Production Per Head Net Availability Per Head 
Sahel India Maharashtra Sahel India Maharashtra 
1971 102 96 51 101 a4 55 
1972 75 92 46 76 84 57 
1973 78 83 27 85 76 46 
1974 115 88 62 120 82 73 
900 = 182 kg. per head per year. 
Source: Jean Dreze, “Famine Prevention in India”, WIDER Conference Paper, to be 
published in J. Dreze and A. Sen, eds.. Hunger: Economics and Policy, to be 
published by Oxford University Press. 
The Chinese experience in this respect has been quite different. 
There was, of course, a very remarkable drop in food output per head 
after the Great Leap Forward (though not more than in some parts of 
India in different years, e.g., in Maharashtra in 19731, but there was 
no major revision of economic policy, no alert anti-famine relief 
operations, and not even an official recognition of the existence of 
famine for a number of years. The famine in China raged on for three 
years, and it is now estimated that the additional mortality because 
of the famine amounted to about 29.5 million.20 It is quite remarkable 
that a famine of this magnitude could continue unrecorded without 
bringing about a major policy shift, and this failure is certainly one 
connected closely with the absence of a relatively free press and the 
absence of opposition parties free to criticize and chastise the 
government in power. It may, thus, be argued that the massive deaths 
connected with starvation and famine during 1958-61 relate closely 
to the issue of freedom of information and criticism. 
Chinese economic reforms 
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While the progress of food production in China was relatively 
moderate until the economic reforms, things have moved very fast 
indeed after 1979. Table 5 presents the gross value of agricultural 
output (including food output) between 1979 and 1986, as reported 
Table 4. Comparative Food Availability Per Head 1983: 
India and Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
Daily Calorie Supply 
Per Head 
Less than India 
Ghana 
Mali 
Chad 
Mozambique 
Benin 
Kenya 
Zambia 
Guinea 
Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso 
Nigeria 
Cameroon 
Angola 
Central African Republic 
Somalia 
Sierra Leone 
1,516 
1,597 
1,620 
1,668 
1,907 
1,919 
1,929 
1,939 
1,956 
2,014 
2,022 
2,031 
2,041 
2,048 
2,063 
2,082 
India 2,115 
More than India 
Sudan 
Zaire 
Botswana 
Togo 
Ethiopia 
Malawi 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Tanzania 
Rwanda 
Uganda 
Liberia 
Lesotho 
Burundi 
Congo 
Senegal 
Ivory Coast 
2,122 
2,136 
2,152 
2,156 
2,162 
2,200 
2,252 
2,271 
2,271 
2,276 
2,351 
2,367 
2,376 
2,378 
2,425 
2,436 
2.576 
Source: World Development Report 1988. Table 28. 
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Table 5. China Since 1979 Reforms (Indices) 
Index 
Gross Value of 
output 
Index 
Death Rate 
Industry Agriculture National Rural 
1979 100 100 100 100 
1980 109 104 102 101 
1981 113 111 102 102 
1982 122 123 106 110 
1983 135 135 114 120 
1984 154 159 108 105 
1985 181 181 106 104 
1986 197 210 108 105 
Sources: People’s Republic of China, Statisticof Yearbook of Chino 1986 (in English]; 1987 
(in Chinese). 
in the Statistical Yearbooks of China. It would seem that the agricul- 
tural output has doubled in the seven years since 1979, and the rate 
of growth of agriculture, which is typically much lower than the 
industrial growth rate, has in fact been exactly comparable. That the 
economic reforms permitting greater freedom to earn profits based on 
economic calculations have been a success from this point of view 
can scarcely be denied. It is possible to question some of the figures, 
and it has sometimes been argued that there were incentives for 
understating the agricultural output in the pre-reform period, but 
even when these corrections are made, the performance of Chinese 
agriculture since the economic reforms must be accepted to be 
altogether exceptional. 
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On the other hand, judged in terms of the freedom to avoid 
escapable mortality, the picture is much muddier. Even in Chart 1, 
one notices a slight tendency for the life expectancy to decline in the 
period following the economic reforms. This is brought out also in 
Table 5 in terms of the index of death rates, which goes up-rather 
than down-in the post-reform period. While the peak increase in 
death rate is now well past, the last reported death rates in China are 
still higher than that in the pre-reform period. Questions can be raised 
about the acceptability of these official mortality statistics, and it 
must also be recognized that the Chinese death rates were very low 
indeed by the time the economic reforms began. But it is still 
remarkable that rather than the increase in material prosperity 
pushing down the death rate, what has happened is some increase 
in mortality rates along with the policy package that has character- 
ized the economic reforms. 
This policy package has included some radical changes in the 
distribution of health care in the rural areas, e.g., a withdrawal from 
the strategy of using “barefoot doctors” (Table 6), and a general 
shortage of public funds for communal health care under the new 
privatized “responsibility system”. Whether the increase in death rate 
is firmly connected causally with these policy changes remains to be 
further investigated, but there is a serious question mark here 
concerning the post-reform economic policies which must be ad- 
dressed. 
It is remarkable that the enormous expansion of life expectancy in 
China, from a figure close to 40 years to one close to 70 years, took 
place in the pre-reform period with only a moderate increase in food 
Table 6. Barefoot Doctors in China 
1970 
Total Female 
Numbers Index Numbers Index 
(Millions) (1975 = 100) (Millions) (1975 = 100) 
1.218 78 ma. n.a. 
1975 1.559 100 0.502 100 
1980 1.463 94 0.489 97 
1981 1.396 90 0.443 88 
1982 1.349 a7 0.410 82 
1983 1.279 a2 0.3 71 76 
1984 1.251 80 0.356 73 
Sources: World Bank, Chino: The Health Sector (19841, for (1970-81); Statistical Yearbooks 
of China 1985 (for 1983 and 1984); Zhongguo tongji nianjion 1985 (for 1981-831. 
The Statistical Yearbooks of China from 1986 onwards do not give the numbers 
of barefoot doctors any more. 17 
availability per head but with a radical expansion in the delivery of 
health care and food to different sections of the population. Since the 
reforms, food availability per head has gone up radically, but the 
delivery system has undergone some changes, including contraction 
in some respects, and there seems to have been some decline from the 
previously achieved peak of high life expectancy and low death rate. 
While the Chinese economic reforms must be praised for what they 
have achieved-the increase in production has been altogether re- 
markable-there is need to reassess the policy lessons of the Chinese 
reforms, especially when attention is shifted from production, GNP 
and output per head, to the basic indicators of the freedom to live 
long and the related positive freedoms. While the Chinese experience 
of famines in 1958-61 raises one type of issue relating food to freedom 
(in that case concerning freedom of information and opposition), the 
post-reform experiences of China raise another type of question 
concerning that relation (involving in this case freedom to avoid 
premature mortality as an indicator of success, as opposed to the size 
of production and output). 
Assessment of Sri Lanka’s achievements 
Another country in which the enhancement of life expectancy has 
received much attention is Sri Lanka. As Table 1 indicated, Sri Lanka 
has a remarkably high life expectancy in comparison with its rela- 
tively low GNP per head. This achievement has been seen as being 
closely related to the policy of public intervention in Sri Lanka.21 
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The role of public intervention in Sri Lanka in enhancing the 
positive freedom to live long has been questioned in a number of 
contributions in recent years, leading to some lively controversies. For 
example, based on comparing Sri Lanka’s performance since 1960 
with other countries, it has been argued that Sri Lanka has not been 
an exceptional performer. 22 Unfortunately, the period chosen for this 
comparative assessment, beginning with 1960, has made these com- 
parative studies quite misleading. Extensive public intervention in Sri 
Lanka began in the early 194Os, and this was indeed accompanied by 
a sharp reduction in death rate, which went down from 20.6 per 
thousand in 1940 to 8.6 per thousand in 1960. By 1960, when the 
now-famous international comparative studies begin, the death rate 
in Sri Lanka was within hitting distance of more advanced countries 
in Europe and America. It is not surprising that the progress since 
then has been relatively slower, especially compared with other 
countries which had more scope for reduction in mortality rates. Also, 
as it happens, the period beyond 1960 has been one of some 
fluctuation of public intervention, and some of the major planks of 
public intervention used in Sri Lanka to enhance the quality of life 
have undergone, in fact, some decline in the 1970s. The policy of free 
or subsidized distribution of rice which was introduced in 1942, has 
suffered from reductions in the later decades, and even the expansion 
of health services which was very fast during the 1940s and 195Os, 
has slowed in the later periods, with a reduction in the number of 
doctors and other medical practitioners in the decade of the 1970s. 
Table 7 presents some of the relevant figures. The fact that the 
enhancement of life expectancy and related indicators has not been 
very fast since 1960 says very little about the alleged lack of 
effectiveness of public delivery systems in the expansion of life 
expectancy in Sri Lanka. By the time the comparative studies begin 
much of the dramatic reduction in death rate in Sri Lanka had already 
taken place, and the comparisons also suffer from concentrating in a 
period in which there was nothing like the steady rise in public 
delivery arrangements for food and health care that had taken place 
in the earlier period, when mortality rates had indeed crumbled at a 
dramatic rate. 
Table 7. Sri Lanka 
Public Distribution 
of Food 
Number 
of 
Medical 
Personnel 
Death Rate 
Per 
Thousand 
1940 
1950 
No 
(Introduced 1942) 
Yes 
271 20.6 
357 12.6 
1960 Yes 557 8.6 
1970 
1960 
Yes 
(Reduced 1%‘2, 1979) 
Yes 
693 7.5 
664 6.1 
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Periodization and British mortality decline 
The issue of periodization, which proves to be central in apprais- 
ing Sri Lanka’s achievements, is in general an important question in 
assessing the effectiveness of different policies in the enhancement 
of life expectancy and in the decline of mortality. Even in Europe 
sharp reductions in premature mortality have been closely connected 
with expansion of public delivery of basic essentials of living, 
including health care and medical attention, and it is possible to move 
towards the identification of the relevant causal connections by 
distinguishing between different periods in which mortality reduc- 
tions have been fast or slow. 
Table 8 presents the extension of life expectancy at birth in 
England and Wales during the first six decades of this century. It can 
be seen that in every decade the life expectancy at birth went up 
moderately-by between one and four years-with two exceptions. 
In the decades between 1911 and 1921 and between 1940 and 1951 
life expectancy increased by nearly seven years. These were, of 
course, the war years, and the improvement is to a great extent, 
recording the impact of public distribution systems that came in with 
protecting the general public from the possible effects of war. Public 
Table 6. Extension of Life Expectancy at Birth: 
England and Wales, 1901-1960 
(additional years) 
Between Men Women 
1901-1911 4.1 4.0 
1911-1921 6.6 6.5 
1921-1931 2.3 2.4 
1931-1940 1.2 1.5 
1940-1951 6.5 7.0 
1951-1960 2.4 3.2 
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Source: S. Preston, N. Keyfitz, and R. Schoen. Causes of Death: Life Tables for National 
Populations (New York. 1972). See also J.M. Winter, The Great War and the British 
People (London: Macmillan. 1966). 
provision of food rationing and distribution, expansion of health 
services (including the introduction of the National Health Service in 
the 194&-r), and other expansions of the involvement of the state in 
distributing food, health care, medical attention, etc., made a radical 
difference to the entitlements to these vital commodities enjoyed by 
the population at large, including its most vulnerable sections. The 
enhancement of life expectancy reflects these results of public policy, 
and it would be a mistake to think of the increase of life expectancy 
in Britain as the result entirely of enhanced overall economic opulence 
(or a general increase in GNP per head). Once the issue of periodiza- 
tion is appropriately faced, it is hard to escape the fact that even in 
the history of a country such as Britain, it is the delivery system of 
food and health care-over and above increases in economic opul- 
ence-that has played a strategic part in crucial periods of expansion 
in the elementary freedom to live long and live well. 
Intrinsic and instrumental roles 
In assessing the relevance of freedom in the making of food policy, 
both the intrinsic and the instrumental perspectives have to be kept 
very firmly in view. The instrumental perspective is often invoked in 
the context of emphasizing economic incentives in the expansion of 
national output in general and food production in particular, and 
there is undoubtedly much to be said for taking adequate note of this 
question, as the experiences of the Chinese economy in particular 
have sharply brought out in recent years. At the same time, the 
instrumental perspective has to be extended from the freedom to earn 
profits to freedoms of broader kinds, including political freedom in 
the form of freedom of opposition, freedom of information, and 
journalistic autonomy. We have seen that these freedoms can be quite 
crucial in the delivery and use of food. 
The instrumental perspective is, however, inherently limited, since 
freedom can be seen as having intrinsic importance as well. In 
assessing economic development and social progress, it is natural to 
think of the enhancement of basic positive freedoms to avoid prema- 
ture mortality, to escape morbidity, to eliminate undernutrition, and 
so on. While freedom is a complex notion, various aspects of it can 
be usefully studied in terms of statistical information of a kind that 
is frequently available and which can be made more easily accessible 
if the perspective of freedom is taken seriously by public policy- 
makers. 21 
The importance of this perspective arises partly from the fact that 
the metrics of gross national product, real income, etc., may often be 
quite misleading about the extents of freedom that people do enjoy 
and can build their lives on. Even in such elementary matters as 
avoiding premature mortality, the statistics of national products 
(including those of food output) can hide more than they reveal. It is 
possible for the national product per head and the food availability 
per person to go up sharply without reducing mortality rates, some- 
times accompanied by increased mortality, as seems to have hap- 
pened in China since the economic reforms of 1979. Once the process 
of economic development is reassessed in terms of the important 
indicators of elementary freedoms, a different light altogether may 
well be cast on economic policy changes that call for adequately 
broad evaluation. The Chinese economic reforms have been undoubt- 
edly extremely successful in terms of raising production and enhanc- 
ing income, but since the post-reform period has also seen an 
increase-rather than a reduction-in death rates, there is room for 
asking searching questions about the nature of the policy package 
that has gone with the economic reforms, and about variations to this 
package that can be considered from the economic point of view. The 
remarkable success of the Chinese economy in raising life expectancy 
at birth, from a figure close to 40 years just after the Revolution to a 
figure close enough to 70 years just prior to the economic reforms, 
was built on paying particular attention to public delivery systems 
involving food, health care, and related necessities. It is this aspect 
of the Chinese success that is in some danger of going out of 
focus-with possibly serious consequences-if the understandable 
concern with raising output and income distracts attention from the 
problem of delivery and public distribution. 
Freedom is not a remote consideration in policymaking. This 
applies just as much to the making and assessing of food policy as it 
does to many other fields of policymaking in social and economic 
matters. Indeed, the inclusion of freedom as a consideration-both at 
the intrinsic and at the instrumental level-has the effect of appro- 
priately broadening the concepts that must be invoked in the formu- 
lation and execution of food policies. The need for that broadening 
has been one of the main contentions I have tried to put across in this 
lecture. 
The perspective of freedom, with its diverse elements, is much too 
22 important to be neglected in the making of food policy. Food and 
freedom are both central concerns in human life, and they have links 
that are both crucial and diverse. These links demand our attention. 
The elementary freedom to live long and live well for a great many 
million people is at stake. 
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